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A

suggestion for the application oflaw

to

the solution of a

social

problem always raises at least three questions. These
are:
(I) How serious is the need for some correction of the
social problem? (2) How great will be the loss offreedom
as the inevitable result of the
application of the coercive
power of Jaw? (3) What are the foreseeable consequences,
intended or unintended, of the legal means of the remedy
which are proposed? In a sense all these questions-and they
could be elaborated into many more-are but parts of one
inquiry into whether the legal cure is not worse than the
social disease. And it is, of course, natural that people will
differ in their judgment as to their prediction of results. It
is perhaps worthwhile reminding ourselves of these obvi
ous
questions, for they emphasize that the separate disci
plines of the social sciences may not be able by themselves,
and in isolation, to determine whether law ought or ought
not be applied in a particular way. In this connection we
should remind ourselves that law is
some of the subtleties of theoretical
the law's
are
or

a

blunt instrument, and
be beyond

analysis may

practical performance.

addition,
concerned,

In

so

far

as

the subtleties of theoretical analysis
be aware that, when the intended

we must

unintended consequences of law's application are con
For
are numerous and complicated.

sidered, the factors

many reasons prediction is not easy. Inevitably, a decisive
role is likely to be played by the basic presumption with

which

we

approach suggestions

for the

application

of law.

The basic presumption, or the alacrity with which sugges
tions for more law are accepted, will determine which side
has the burden of persuasion.

presumption concerning the
to be
role
oflaw
be
said
closely related to the
proper
may
of
is
which
the
antitrust,
history
history of the use oflaw in
That
a
is
particular way.
history not simple, and it includes
diverse
and
sometimes
many
contradictory ideas and
The choice of the basic

movements.

It is

perhaps

an

oversimplification

to

suggest
use of
law and in favor of freedom from law in the pursuit of
trade. To be sure, the origins of antitrust reflect an opposi
tion to the exercise of power by the government in inter
ference with freedom of trade. The opposed governmental
power manifested itself either in monopoly grants or in the
misuse of grants by semigovernmental or semiprivate
gropps. But the underlying theory of antitrust is sometimes
summarized not so much as an opposition to interference
by the government through law with the freedom of trade
but rather as directed against the usurpation of governmenthat antitrust itself reflects

tal power

by private groups. Monopoly in its various forms
private hands was thought to be such a usurpation. So
the underlying presumption of antitrust might be thought
to be not so much
against governmental power or interfer
ing laws but rather as against that private power which
in
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A
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a

presumption against the

when it reaches monopoly strength has the effect oflaw. A
persistent theme in antitrust enforcement, however, has
been to create a code of fair competition or at least to give
relief to, or erect safeguards for, private parties who are
considered injured by unfair tactics. And in this sense an
underlying presumption of antitrust might be thought to
be in favor of the use of law to interfere with trade if the
result is increased fairness. So antitrust might be regarded,
then, as but another instrument of law for governmental
planning for, and interference with, the competitive
economy.

the

complexities of the history of
which it has been put, there proba
bly is agreement that the antitrust laws are supposed to be
characterized as distinctive because they do not represent
government planning Jor the economy. In this sense they
are
supposed to be non-regulatory. They are supposed to
be based on freedom from law, both the private variety and
the public, for a competitive economy. And such interfer
ence as the law
inevitably brings is justified as the minimum
interference or regulation made necessary because of the
existence otherwise of monopoly. And possibly therefore
we can
say, that the antitrust laws basically reflect a pre
sumption that the burden of persuasion must be placed on
the side of those who urge the application oflaw to a social
problem. As I have suggested, it could be urged that this
statement of the presumption reflected in antitrust is too
far-reaching and that, indeed, all we know is that the anti
trust laws are against some forms of
private power on the
somewhat dubious basis that private power is less good than
public. But we must recall that the antitrust laws are not
Yet

acknowledging

antitrust, and the

against private
least until
power,
ference

uses to

power in its

nor,

as

has

so

numerous

manifestations. At

not even against economic
often been said, do they justify inter

recently they

were

compel all competition that is possible. For the
most part
they are directed solely against monopoly and
those restraints oftrade which in antitrust history have come
to be
thought inextricably interwoven with monopoly.
to

Thus the

use

of law and the role of government are" nar
and this is supposed to be the distinctive

rowly confined,

feature of antitrust.
In large measure this limited conception of the role' of
law as reflected in the antitrust laws was the reason that the
revival of antitrust enforcement in the Robert Jackson and
Thurman Arnold period was greeted with scepticism.
Monopoly then was popularly regarded as a significant
cause for
unemployment and depression. The solution of
the monopoly problem was regarded as particularly diffi
cult because of the assumption, held by many, that new
conditions of economic life required firms to reach monop
oly size. A widely held view was that any attempt to deal

The
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problem through antitrust would be an ineffective
effort to turn back the clock. In the wake of the demise of
the NRA many thought some new form of economic plan
ning and control would have to be devised. Symbolically,
antitrust enforcement, which gained formulation and mo
mentum under Arnold, represented the alternative to plan
ning and control. Antitrust came to portray the federal
with this

enterprise, and this was a free
government's
dom from administrative regulation as well as from monop
oly enterprise. To be sure, it was suggested that the new
consent decrees were to become charters for industry and
thus a constructive formulation of administrative rules for
industry. But this promise was unfulfilled. Rather through
many devices, in retrospect some good and some bad, the
antitrust ideal was revived. The antitrust laws, at least in the
abstract, became popular. The effect was to be seen not
only in enforcement policy but in the substantive content
of the laws themselves. As a result, in every subdivision of
interest in free

the laws, whether

dealing

with patents,

price-fixing

agree

division of

territory arrangements, or
size
as
monopolizing, there was an expansion of
monopoly
labor area was the one exception.
The
legal concepts.
If the application of law to a social problem raises the
question of whether the cure is worse than the disease, then
ments,

conspiracies,

problem has to be faced in terms of the situation as it
at
particular time. While there is a great deal of con
of
talk between the Arnold period and the present,
tinuity

the

exists

there

a

are numerous

Law School

University of Chicago

differences between the total situation

it is found today and the prior period. The connection
between the monopoly problem and business cycle, de
pression, and unemployment no longer seems as decisive as
it then did to many; indeed, the connection seems remote

as

11

question, of course, is whether
this economic power means monopoly. So far as the law is
concerned, firms of monopoly size which operate without
with distributors. An initial

economic

sionary

justification or, more certainly, engage in exclu
are
guilty of monopolizing and can be dealt

tactics

with under the antitrust laws. Are these the firms which

thought to have undue economic power, or does that
concept refer to firms beyond the scope of the present law's
reach? If the latter is the case, is this because the law's defi
nition of monopoly or monopolizing is out of step with
are

the economic definition and is wrong? Or is economic
power something beyond and above monopoly or monop
olizing for economics as well as for law? These seem to be
basic issues when the law approaches what is often de
scribed
It

as

must

the present monopoly problem.
be admitted at once that the law in action

flects

uncertainty

case.

But

re

what

illegal monopoly or monop
olizing is. The law has sometimes appeared to incorporate
the idea that illegal monopoly or monopolizing exists, at
least when there is no justification, when a single firm
through control of its own output can change the market
price. The firm is then said to be engaged in a kind of price
fixing certainly as effective as illegal price-fixing arrange
.ments between competitors dominant in an industry. This
indeed might be thought to be the doctrine of the Alcoa
as

to

Alcoa, under the computation used, controlled

of the output. The opinion states that such a
percentage is enough to constitute a monopoly and goes on
to
say that it is doubtful whether 60 or 64 per cent would
90

per

cent

enough. Yet producer of that lesser amount and con
siderably smaller amounts would be able to change the
price by curtailing his own production. His control would
be

a

except for the possible accentuating effect of rigid prices.
Perhaps therefore there is less of a felt need to do anything.
about the monopoly problem. Moreover, reflective studies
do not show any recent significant increase in concentra
tion; indeed, they do not show any significant increase
since 1904. The sense of urgency previously present either
has or should have disappeared. Further, if the greatest con
tribution of the Arnold period was the symbolization of the

Continued on

page 26

government's interest in free enterprise as opposed to con
through regulation, perhaps in the present setting this
is no longer so much required. Moreover, it is no longer so
clear what symbolic meaning is to be attributed to anti

trol

trust

enforcement.

Probably what is regarded as the continuing monopoly
problem today is the existence of economic power in firms
of large size. Many of these firms are in industries where a
relatively few firms have a major portion of the output.
Thus oligopoly is thought to require special attention. And
because the problem of economic power through size is
hard to handle directly, in that economic power is hard to
evaluate and that the allowable limits are not easy to deter
mine, much attention has been centered on the causes and
effects of this power, as, for example,
price dis

Judge Sterry

crimination, exclusive arrangements, and unfair

Second Circuit.

mergers,

dealing
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But it has
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be absolute, of course, because
ucts would be substituted; and,
not

at some

level other

prod

given time, competitors

would increase their production. He shares these deficien
cies, however, with firms of greater proportionate magni
tude, although the effect of his action would not be so great
or so lasting. Nevertheless, such a lesser firm could be
regarded, although the law has not done so, as possessing

illegal monopoly

power.
The decision of the law

regard such lesser firms
exercising illegal monopoly power probably reflects a
judgment that the law should not interfere where the mag
nitude of the monopoly effect is not great. I note that Dr.
Stocking in his article on the Cellophane case states that
"detecting monopoly is simpler than measuring it" and
that he quotes Fritz Machlup as being "probably correct"
in "concluding that 'so many different elements enter into
what is called a monopolistic position and .so complex are
their combined effects that a measurement of "the" degree
of monopoly is even conceptually impossible.'" But I
would question whether detecting monopoly for the pur
not to

as

oflaw
pose of bringing the coercive force
matter can

magnitude.
Cellophane

be

so

The

to

bear upon the

easily separated from the problem of its
problem is of course illustrated by the

one can accept the fact that in
control over 75 per cent of a
had
Cellophane
"market" and yet conclude that the albeit imperfect sub
stitutability of other products may limit the magnitude of
control sufficiently, so that the coercive force of law need

where

case,

some sense

applied. It would be extremely difficult, as has been
suggested, to measure the magnitude of the monopoly. But
a Court
possibly might be forgiven for recognizing the
availability of near-substitutes which it has seen by visiting
the I952 Annual Packaging Show at Atlantic City.
not

be

The choice of the law then seems to be not to interfere
monopoly power. The magnitude of the power is
taken into account, although without much precision. I am

with all

Justice Reed can know, as he writes in
Cellophane opinion, that "one can hardly say that brick

not sure

the

how Mr.

tried

never

the market

to

reach all firms which
their

price by curtailing

It is difficult

to

own

can

change

production.

say that the choice should have been

thing we recognize and accept through
the market many forms of minor monopoly power.
The existence of minor monopoly power in the form of
advantages of location or product differentiation has some
otherwise. For

one

out

to
argue the inevitability of monopoly
small
both
and
power,
large. I do not see how this confusion
is helpful, but it suggests that we really are not much
concerned with the minor and more transient forms of

times been used

monopoly

of small

magnitude.

A

more

important point

is

toward the less obvious cases of
various
difficulties arise. Not the least of
monopoly power,
these is that the law gets converted more and more into a
kind of supervision of industry. This is particularly true if

that,

once

the law

moves

industry's cost structure, and the reasons for it, and the
profits and the explanation for them are permitted
or
required to be an issue in the case. Presumably, the argu
ments of justification will become more difficult to evalu
ate, and the standard of application probably will be less
clear than it is now. Although it would not help on the
problem of market definition, a partial escape would be
to suggest an arbitrary and, in this context, lower percent
the

firm's

even if this were feasible,
age rule and hold fast to it. But,
the argument for this is less compelling when it has not been

shown that concentration has

significantly

increased.

often is made that special consideration
should be given to the problem of oligopoly. Hence a dis
tinction is made between the single firm oflesser monopoly
size and power which exists in an area where there are
many competitive firms of small size and the single firm
which exists alongside of a few other firms of somewhat
similar size. In the latter case it is suggested that an inherent
propensity toward joint action permits or compels the
aggregation of the several units so that a level of undoubted
monopoly strength is visible. The law's approach to this
But the argument

accomplished either through a
doctrine of conspiracy which would permit the aggregation
or, without conspiracy, by treating the existence of the
could be

special problem

with steel or wood or cement or stone in the
of
Sherman Act litigation." It seems rather that in
meaning
case
a
they might be thought to compete. I believe
given
the point is rather that the Sherman Act, on the monopoly
side, is reserved for the more obvious cases of monopolies

other firms as one of the circumstances of the market adding
to the monopoly strength of each of the firms. Both the
Paramount case and the second American Tobacco case

magnitude. In this sense the percentage of market con
trol and the availability of imperfect substitutes are both
relevant. The question of monopoly profits has been con
sidered less relevant; the law's emphasis has been on price
or
production control and not on the presence of rewards.
It should be said that the law, through concepts of attempts
to monopolize and conspiracies to monopolize, and by
emphasizing intent or particular abusive acts, has reached
firms with monopoly power considerably less than that of
the Alcoa type. It must be said also that it has not always

what easier for the

competed

with

known what

to

do with them after it has reached them.

adopting or did adopt the first approach. The
approach through the doctrine of conspiracy is made some
came near

to

law, because conspiracy

in

antitrust

least the im

be based on agreement,
can be found in a common concert of
action, sometimes popularly described by the somewhat
discredited phrase "conscious parallelism." But the legal
relief which would follow as the result of a successful case
based on this theory need not curtail the power of the in
dividual firm. The agreement or conspiracy can be treated
cases

plied

as an

not

at

agreement

illegal

act

appended

to

a

position of otherwise legiti

power. On the other hand, a successful case brought
the theory that in the circumstances of the industry the

mate
on

need

or

The
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power.
Difficulties

situation, in a sea of doubt, caught between the prototype
of monopoly and that of competition. But in the main the
choice of the law has been, as I have suggested, to reserve
its scope of prohibition for the cases of more assured mo

specific agreements should be irrelevant. A large jump is
likely/to be involved in reasoning which moves from a find

nopoly strength. It has chosen in the main to be an anti
monopoly law and not law in favor of all competition
possible. Such choice may leave untouched large area
of economic power, although perhaps it is somewhat diffi
cult to know what is meant by this term.

individual firm was guilty of monopolizing presumably
would have to deal directly with the question of allowable
are involved under either theory. Under the
doctrine of conspiracy the best evidence would appear to
be specific agreements, whereas under the rationale for giv
ing special consideration to the problem of oligopoly the

ing of specific agreements
sion that there is

among the firms.

a

on some matters to

general partnership

Indeed, the need

to

in

have

a

strong attempt has been made to
prevent the creation of monopoly
change
in its incipiency and so in this way to avoid for the future
cases oflesser
monopoly power. The attempt has been made
also to curb conduct thought to be based upon and perhaps
In this situation

the conclu

the law

monopolizing
specific agree

may suggest general rivalry and not inherent com
action. If there is anything to this suggestion, the case

ments
mon

a

a

a

so as to

further lesser monopoly power. I refer to the prohibition
of mergers and other conduct such as price discrimination
or exclusive
arrangements which in the language of the
Act
Clayton
may have the effect of substantially lessening

situation, with or
approach is made
conspiracy,
the
on a
presence of oligopolies
straight monopoly theory.
fashioned as a result of decrees in monopoly cases would be

to

an

abiding embarrassment. It is not unlikely this embarrass
would multiply as new distinctions would have to be
made to justify more or less competition or larger or

competition

ment

ton

smaller size for various industries. Of course it can be said
that such distinctions are inevitable when an antimonopoly
law is applied. But the problems arising out of them seem

Robinson-Patman Act has

for

special

less

acute

treatment

of the

oligopoly

is weakened. If the

without

when the law is

applied only

to

largely

ments

efficiency.
situation is

monopoly
oligopoly
thought to rest on an inherent propensity toward

joint action, unless a somewhat doubtful economic assertion
is to be converted into an irrefutable assumption oflaw, the
issue of how much joint action there has been, and how

rivalry, will be present in all these cases.
It is obvious that many of these theoretical and practical
difficulties arise out of a desire to curtail economic power,
even though the economic power does not flow from a full
monopoly position. It is the monopoly of the single firm

much

an
industry, even though there is a problem of
the
market, which is more readily detected. And
defining
there is less reason then for measuring the consequences of
the firm's position, for they can be predicted theoretically.

occupying

And while the firm may be allowed to justify its position
because monopoly was thrust upon it, not even the rule of
reason
requires an inquiry into effect. When monopoly

restraints, however, are thought to encompass position and
behavior further removed from the status and consequences
of the single firm occupying a market, the law loses its guide
for action. It finds itself, as Judge Taft stated in a related

Act has been

cover a

amount

substantial number of outlets and

of

products.

The

new

a

Automobile

Dealer Franchise Act creates a new right of action to com
pel manufacturers to act "in good faith" in connection with
dealer franchises. And there is a strong movement to have
a law enacted which will require notification to the gov
ernment, the furnishing of information, and a waiting

period

the

power in the

monopoly. The Clay

jeopardized price differences.
interpreted to pre
Clayton
exclusive
some
dealing arrange
qualifications,

which

substantial

of scale, has a greater burden to overcome. As one moves
downward in the scale of market control, however, not
only will there be more cases, but the balance between
curbing lesser monopoly effects and yet giving due regard

And if the

to create a

prohibition of mergers has been strengthened,
through the inclusion of asset acquisitions. The

vent, with

the firms of quite

efficiency argument will be harder to strike. Since the
rewards of lesser monopoly power are less certain, size is
more
likely to have been caused by the requirements of

of tending

Section 3 of the

high percentage of market control. With such firms the
monopoly effects are presumably great, and the argument
in favor of dispensation for them, because of the efficiencies

to

or

Act's

.

before

a

merger

maybe

consummated.

The attempt to have more stringent prohibition of merg
ers-and the pre-merger notification bill must be regarded
attempt both to supervise and to prevent-is presuma
based
on two
arguments. The first is that any merger
bly
reduces the number of competitors. This argument has
force, of course, only if it is assumed that the reduction
makes for a difference worth talking about. The second

as an

argument is that growth through merger is likely not to be
the most efficient growth responding to the economies of
scale. But of course there may be genuine economies of
scale in growth, even though the growth is through merger.
And assuming the existence of what is called a relatively
few firms, the resulting capacity of the industry may be

appropriate if growth

through merger. Since it is
prohibit all mergers, some
possible
standard will have to be used by the law in prohibiting
particular mergers. That standard undoubtedly must relate
to market control, although it might encompass questions
of efficiency and capacity in the industry. The central ques
tion surely is not whether the growth takes place through

more

not

or

desirable

is

to

merger but rather the result ofthe merger in
must

is

terms

of power

possible justification. Separate antimerger legislation
proceed upon the basis, however, that power which
allowable when obtained through internal growth may

and
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be denied

to

growth through

merger, because the

the law, in any event, is that antimerger legislation, while
a means of
growth, attempts to infuse into the
law a double standard of market control. This division of

means

effect.
Actually the standard used for the prohibition of mergers
in the Clayton Act is most unclear. Perhaps the most that
can be said about it is that the standard is intended to
go
used

create a

presumption concerning

motive

emphasizing

or

beyond the Sherman Act but not too far. The allowable
limits of economic or monopoly power are to be decreased
when mergers are involved. But the.Clayton Act applies
not only to horizontal mergers but to vertical and
conglom
erate as well. The inclusion of vertical
integration is under
standable, since there is a widely held belief that vertical
integration gives a leverage for the creation of greater
monopoly power. It may be suggested that this theory is
usually wrong except in the unique case where vertical
integration in foreclosing an outlet to a competitor happens
to place a greater cost on the competitor than on the
acquiring company by this maneuver. The inclusion of
conglomerate mergers suggests that the antimerger legisla
tion need be not about monopoly power at all but about
size or some economic power which is hard- to defme or to
understand and therefore will be equally hard to enforce.
But probably what is intended is a general move downward
in the scale toward lesser monopoly power, although why
such power should be more dangerous in the hands of a
firm operating in several industries rather than in only one

.

explain.
justification for special antimerger legislation is not
obvious. The justification does not ring true if it is based
on
any special inadequacy in the relief given by courts when
monopoly has been achieved through merger. On the
contrary, the difficulties of obtaining adequate relief are
greater when monopoly is achieved through internal
growth. Nor can it be said that special legislation was re
quired so that the law would give special scrutiny in mo
nopoly cases to those instances where the growth was
through acquisitions, for this always has been the emphasis
under Section II of the Sherman Act. Perhaps it will be
said that mergers should be prevented, since they lead to
ward concentration, although the results of the mergers do
not always show up as a monopolized market, because there
are
countervailing tendencies. But, if this is so, then there is
less need for governmental intervention. The difficulty for
is

not

easy

to

The

Standards is not reinforced by new
learning reflected in new
concepts of market control. It is a different and more diver
gent double standard than has existed to some degree in the
Sherman Act up to now. It will be difficult to maintain
such a double standard. It has been said that the idea is not
so much to have a double substantive standard but rather
to have the courts and the Federal Trade Commission
pre
vent individual mergers on the basis of more doubtful
proof. This suggests a dubious limitation of freedom, in
that generally we would not want to have courts accept
doubtfUl proof, particularly when it has not been shown
that mergers have resulted in a significant increase in the
level of concentration almost since the turn of the century.
I do not wish to overemphasize the newness of the tend
encies to push the antitrust laws into operation against the

lesser forms of monopoly
encies have existed for
more

laws

to

economic power. These tend

character of the antitrust laws. The antitrust
non-regulatory only when they are not in frequent

are

interference with business decisions-when the laws are
reserved for cases of larger monopoly power and for tra
ditional restraints such as price-fixing thought to have the
same effect as
larger mono pol y power. The curtailment of
exclusive arrangements and the regulation of pricing poli
cies under the Clayton and the Robinson-Patman acts, the
regulation of mergers (horizontal, vertical, and conglomer
ate) and the suggested pre-merger notification bill, the spe
cial act requiring good faith behavior of automobile manu
facturers in connection with franchises-all these reflect a
movement to convert the
antimonopoly laws into fair
when
fre
quent government inspection of business practices in formal
hearings, with the necessity for justification, for the sub
mission of data and the
requirement of delay. Perhaps,
there
is
reason
to
then,
pause before a law which has sym
bolized free enterprise is converted into but another con
geries of regulatory statutes for the control of business.

practice regulatory
there is
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statutes.
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